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This conclusion summarizes the evidence explaining the divergent trajectories taken by post 
Arab Uprising states in terms of multiple variables, each illustrated by an iconic case, 
namely: State Failure and Competitive governance (Syria), Regime Restoration and Hybrid 
Governance (Egypt) and Polyarchic Governance (Tunisia). Factors include the starting point: 
levels of opposition mobilization and regimes’ resilience--a function of their patrimonial-
bureaucratic balance; whether or not a transition coalition forms is crucial for 
democratization prospects. Context also matters for democratization, particularly political 
economic factors, such as a balance of class power and a productive economy; political 
culture (level of societal identity cleavages) and a minimum of international intervention. 
Finally, the balance of agency between democracy movements, Islamists, the military and 
workers shapes democratization prospects.   
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The introduction to this issue surveyed how starting points—regimes and uprisings against 
them—made some subsequent trajectories more likely than others. Thus, violent uprisings 
and state failure sharply narrowed democratization prospects, while relatively peaceful 
transitions widened them. However, as the subsequent chapters showed, agency—the 
struggle of rival social forces in the period after Uprisings began-- also contributed to 
outcomes. Such agency was itself affected by the political economy, political cultural and 
international contexts. Together, starting points, subsequent agency and context shaped 
divergent trajectories of post-uprising regime re-formation.  
 
Agency 
Anti-regime democracy movements  
Secular middle class youth with their Internet proficiency were instrumental in overcoming 
atomization and enabling anti-regime mobilization. In particular, the unemployed educated, 
seeking themselves as the victims of discriminatory crony capitalism, embraced democracy 
as the answer. The peaceful protest their discourse promoted was compatible with a 
democratic transition. They were the vanguard of movements that forced the departure of 
authoritarian leaders and/or won potentially democratic constitutional changes. However, the 
youth movements proved unable to capitalize on the fall or weakening of old regimes.  
 Vincent Durac pointed to the leaderless, highly heterogeneous nature of the anti-
regime movements that shared only the desire for the fall of the regime, and that, once this 
happened, quickly divided into contentious factions. Their lack of ideology and organization 
meant they did not constitute a counter government that could replace incumbent regimes, 
not mobilize empowering mass votes. Moreover, splits between secularists and Islamists 
broke the anti-regime front, enabling the deep state to recover. In Egypt and Morocco, secular 
liberals’ inability to compete with the Islamists in elections quickly compromised their 
commitment to democracy and revived the ability of the “deep state”—the military or the 
monarchy—to use them against the Islamists. Only in Tunisia did secular forces remain 	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united enough to both balance and compromise with Islamists. In cases such as Syria and 
Libya, the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the movements meant they could not reach any 
kind of pacted transition with incumbent rulers and, as a result, soon became armed factions, 
propelling state failure and much reducing the prospects of a democratic outcome.  
Islamists:  
Islamist movements were key actors in post-Uprising political contestation. Variations in 
their relations with ruling regimes and other political forces were central to outcomes. 
Islamists’ critics widely predicted that democratic elections could bring anti-democratic 
Islamists to power who would end democracy. Others argued that inclusion in the political 
process incentivized Islamists to moderate their ideologies in order to enable anti-
authoritarian coalitions with secular opposition groups, maximize their voter appeal, and 
negotiate constraints from secular institutions such as the military and judiciary.1  
 Initially, Islamists appeared to be the main beneficiaries, with their organized 
committed activist followings, electoral experience, charity networks, schools and television 
stations, welfare services and ability to speak for the deprived, funding from the Gulf, 
competitive advantage from use of mosques and madrassas for recruitment; and the greater 
debilitation of the secular political opposition under authoritarian rule. Post-Uprising, while 
liberals and secularists focused on street protests, the Islamists concentrated on organizing for 
elections and in Tunisia and Egypt Islamists got pluralities in the first democratic elections, 
but not solid majorities needed to marginalize opposition and govern effectively.2  
 However Islamists were themselves variegated, all were not equally empowered and 
inter-Islamist splits soon cost them their opportunity to achieve hegemony.  In their 
contribution to this special issue, Frédéric Volpi and Ewan Stein assessed the fortunes of 
three brands of Islam after the Uprising. Initially the Muslim Brotherhood’s state-oriented 
“electoral Islam” appeared to be empowered by the removal of authoritarian presidents, as 
well by the support and inspiration of Turkey’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), a model 
of apparently successful pragmatic Islamic governance. Salafists, already on the rise before 
the Uprising, were energized and propelled into the political arena by the Uprising and by 
funding from Saudi Arabia, which saw them as an instrument against both the Muslim 
Brotherhood and secular revolutionaries. The behaviour of the Brothers in Egypt where, 
outflanked and pushed right by the Salafists, they broke several promises not to push their 
agenda too far alarmed secularists, with similar tensions observable in Tunisia.3 Trans-state 
jihadist movements inspired by al-Qaida initially appeared discredited by the prospect of 
democratization via peaceful protest. However, the new opportunities in failed states 
resulting from civil war in the Levant and North Africa, combined with the military’s 
repression of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, reversed the relative power balance within the 
Islamist camp. This empowering of non-democratic and violent jihadists (Syria/Iraq); the 
military’s political exclusion of a significant sector of Islamic civil society (Egypt); and the 
renewed ability of revived regimes to play off rival brands of Islamists and secularists halted 
moves toward democratization. Without inclusion of Islamist movements willing to play by 
democratic rules, such as the Brothers, with their mass constituencies, greatest capacity 
among social forces to balance the power of the state, and unique ability to confer legitimacy 
on market capitalism, no democratic transition is likely.4  
  
The military and security forces:  
Eva Bellin5 argued that a main ingredient of authoritarian resilience had for many decades 
been the reliability of large effective security forces and that, similarly, military responses to 
the Uprisings were crucial to outcomes. These responses varied depending on factors such as 
the institutional autonomy, repressive capabilities, and interests (political, economic, 
communal, professional) of military establishments.6 Initially, seeing the rapid departure of 
presidents in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, many judged that political mobilization had 
exceeded the repressive containment powers of the old regimes; however, the military and 
security forces have re-grouped, restoring some of the old state-society (im)balance. In his 
contribution to this special issue, Joshua Stacher,  observes that while states may have been 
weakened by the Uprising, regimes, and particularly their coercive cores, have not only 
survived but also dramatically expanded the use of violence to rescue old orders.  
 Variations in the military’s role were pivotal for outcomes. In Egypt, where the 
military retained institutional autonomy of the top political leadership and also had conflicts 
of interest with presidential families as well as a large stake in the preservation of the 
establishment, including considerable command of large sectors of the economy, it sacrificed 
the president to preserve itself and the institutions and territorial integrity of the state. Its 
dependence on Western support also made it unwilling to risk their funding via mass 
repression on behalf of the president. Once Mubarak departed, Egypt’s large politicized army 
attempted to retain command of the transition process and steer it in such as way as to 
preserve its interests. When it faced resistance, it did not hesitate to repress protestors when 
they targeted its own interests and particularly in its attacks on the Muslim Brothers after al-
Sisi’s coup it showed that an institutionalized US funded military was no less willing than 
patrimonial leaders to use massive violence to defend its vital interests. Moreover, it 
possessed the repressive capacity to reassert control over Egyptian society and territory (even 
if contested in Sinai). This was pivotal in enabling restoration of a hybrid regime. By contrast 
in Tunisia the limited repressive capacities and de-politicization of the military was decisive 
for enabling democratic transition. 
 In Syria, sectarian penetration and Ba’thist politicization of the military reduced its 
autonomy, keeping the bulk of it loyal to the regime. Identity differences between the 
military and protestors much reduced the chances of defections from the security forces when 
they were ordered to fire on civilians, hence the chances of a transition pact. The Syrian 
military retained enough institutional cohesion defend the regime from collapse; yet 
incremental defections on identity grounds, acquired enough critical mass to staff a rival 
‘Free Syrian Army’, leading to militarized civil war and stalemate.  
 In Libya and Yemen militaries were least institutionalized and most communally 
riven, thus most vulnerable to fairly rapid and major splits along tribal and family lines. 
Where, they split, with part remaining loyal to the leader and part opposed, the outcome was 
stalemate (Yemen). Where, as in Libya, the military disintegrated, a function of Qaddafi’s 
weakening it as an institution, the result was state failure.  
 
Workers:  
In his contributory article, Jamie Allinson examines the variable impact of the working 
classes on post-Uprising trajectories. Where workers movements were, as a result of greater 
industrialization, larger and better organized, as in Egypt and Tunisia, even though their top 
leadership had long been co-opted by regimes, they played key roles in anti-authoritarian 
mobilization. Workers’ unions were pivotal in the mobilization against the president in 
Tunisia where the formal union structure recovered its autonomy and helped organize the 
Uprising. In Egypt, Tripp7 argues that nationwide strike action made it clear to the Egyptian 
military that opposition to Mubarak was too deep and widespread to be rolled back.  
 In alliance with the middle class, workers, as Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 
show, 8  are crucial elements of a democratic coalition that is necessary to drive 
democratization. Aschar observes that workers constituted the real alternative to the other 
two post-Uprising contending forces, the military/state establishment and Islamist 
movements, both of which stood for variations of the neo-liberalism against which the 
uprisings initially mobilized.9 Yet, the outcome has not been uniform, with the official unions 
co-opted by the military in Egypt and playing the key brokerage role in democratic 
consolidation in Tunisia. The marginalization of organized workers during the Uprisings in 
Syria, Libya and Yemen, was associated with both state failure and democratic failure.  
 Generally, it can be hypothesized that the balance of agency between these four actors 
will bias trajectories in certain ways. Where pro-democracy social movements and organized 
workers are strong, the military weak or non-political and Islamists moderate, chances for 
polyarchy are best (Tunisia); where the military is strong and politicized, Islamists moderate 
and democracy and workers movements fairly strong, a hybrid formula results (Egypt); a 
strong military, radicalization of Islamists, and weakened democracy movements and worker 
unions biases the outcome toward state failure and civil war (Syria).  
   
The Political Economy Context  
Outcomes are, however, not merely the result of agency, which must operate within a pre-
existing political economy structure. Historical sociologists such as Barrington Moore10 
showed that variations in modernising coalitions shape democracy possibilities: where the 
state joined with the landed oligarchy to repress and exploit the peasantry to serve an 
agricultural export strategy, the result was conservative authoritarianism, while if the 
peasants were included in a radical coalition against the landed class, authoritarianism of the 
left resulted—as in the Arab populist republics. Moore and later Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens showed that inclusive democratization requires a balance of class power, including 
some state autonomy of the dominant classes and a bourgeois alliance with the organized 
working class to extract power sharing from the state.  
 In MENA, however, political economy is unfavourable to democratization. First, 
rentier states produce state-dependent bourgeoisies and clientalized citizens (combined in 
many cases, with readily expelled expatriate labour); indeed, states with copious rent have 
proved most resistant to the Uprising. Second, the pathway of the earlier populist regimes, 
under which a more inclusive ruling coalition corresponded to social reform and import 
substitute industrialization, was cut short by some combination of capital accumulation 
failures, lost wars and international financial institution (IFI) pressures for “structural 
adjustment.” The neo-liberal “solution” to the populist crisis--re-empowering investors and 
export strategies that required the repression of labour costs--shaped new state-crony 
capitalist coalitions to exclude labour as well as deepening dependencies on global finance 
capital.  Neo-liberalism drives a wedge between bourgeoisie and workers at the expense of 
the democratic coalition between them needed to check the power of the deep state.  
 While the Uprisings were rooted in protest at the neo-liberal “solution,” Aschar11 
observes that they remained purely political, with no attempts to attack economic injustice or 
dysfunction; rather, they actually worsened economic growth, hence prospects for addressing 
unemployment, by deterring investors, particularly in manufacturing. Moreover, a root cause 
of under-investment, the exceptional export of MENA capital to the West by family dynasties 
in oil rich mini-states, at the expense of regional investment, can hardly be addressed by 
revolutions in the republics. In parallel, the enduring dependence on the Western-centred 
international financial system locked Egypt and Tunisia, the two states with the best 
prospects for democratization, into neo-liberal practices that removed the big issues of 
politics—distribution of wealth—from domestic political agendas.  
  With socio-economic alternatives off the political agenda, political competition in the 
post-Uprising states was diverted into cultural wars over identity issues framed in de-
stabilizing zero-sum terms (Islamist vs. secularist, Sunni vs. Shia). Under such conditions, 
political pluralism, where it survives, is likely to be mixed with doses of authoritarian power 
in order to manage identity conflicts and turn back demands for social justice that cannot be 
accommodated in a global neo-liberal economic order. The least bad outcome under neo-
liberalism has tended to be “low intensity democracy“ in which elections serve as an 
institutionalized mechanism for elite circulation that may constrain the state but only 
marginally empowers the masses;12this may well lead to their disillusionment and support for 
alternatives such as Salafism or even for restorations of elements of the old regime. Indeed, in 
Tunisia where democratic transition was most advanced, disillusionment with democracy set 
in, political contestation was diverted into cultural wars and the October 2014 elections led to 
a certain restoration of old elites. This does not mean indigenous agency and resistance is 
unimportant: Tripp suggests that within the global neo-liberal order, resistance can alleviate 
the worse effects of the system or carve out a space for autonomous action. For Aschar 
outcomes depend on freedom for organized workers’ movements and on the “unblockage” of 
investment propensities among an industrial bourgeoisie in order to re-start growth.13 One 
could therefore hypothesize, that a degree of economic “unblockage” and some balance 
between classes (bourgeoisie and workers) and between classes and the state (as in Tunisia) 
facilitates democratic transition; their absence underlies either autocracy or state failure if 
radical movements fill the vacuum; while a middle scenario of some balance enables hybrid 
regimes.  
   
Between Structure and Agency: the Political Cultural Variable: 
Political culture is a residue of historical structures that constrains agency as well as being 
reproduced and altered by it. Given that culture changes only over long periods while the 
Arab world has experienced both authoritarian quiescence and attempted democratic 
revolution in a period of mere decades, culture, per se, would appear to carry limited 
explanatory power.14 It might be argued that the historic cycles of popular submission when 
the state is strong and revolt when it is weak reflects a durable political culture inhospitable 
to democracy. 15   Yet polling evidence that Arabs, including pious Muslims, value 
democracy16 and the demand for it expressed by millions of Arabs in the Uprising, seems 
incompatible with the exceptionalist image of an unchanging Middle East cultural propensity 
for authoritarian rule.  
 However, Stepan and Linz 17suggest that disputes over the role of religion in politics 
have made it difficult for Arab societies to arrive at a consensus on democratic rules of the 
game. Symptomatically, all parties in Egypt wanted limits on majorities built into the 
constitution: secularists wanted the military to introduce guarantees against Islamist 
majorities while the Muslim Brotherhood wanted legislation vetted by a religious body like 
Iran’s Council of Guardians. This suggests that support for democracy can be wide but 
shallow: middle class secularists may value personal liberty more than democracy and 
sacrifice the latter if it means Islamists can curtail the former; Islamists can value democracy 
but subordinate it to religious law. 
  Nevertheless, culture and identity are far from fixed. Dialogue can enable 
compromise across cultural differences and contentious politics tends to harden them. In this 
respect, a main locus of cultural interaction, the media, played a prominent but two-sided 
role. While the new media--satellite television and the internet—had, prior to the Uprisings, 
apparently produced an Arab public sphere that promoted an informed and active citizenry 
tolerant of a pluralism of views, once they became instruments of political struggle during the 
Uprising, democratic civility gave way to hyperbole and polarization. With the much 
renewed permeability of weakened states, the internet became a vehicle of misinformation, 
while satellite TV channels, owned by Gulf states, business tycoons, salafi preachers or 
sectarian groups, became instruments to fight proxy cultural wars that fragmented the new 
public.18 Where, in the many multi-identity societies of the region, elements of shared civic 
identity were shattered by the instrumentalist use of sectarian cleavages, as in Bahrain and 
Syria, media-spread sectarian discourse diverted mass mobilization into sectarian conflict; 
even in homogeneous societies such as Egypt, cultural wars were constructed as the 
secularists and the military launched a sustained media campaign to demonize the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Such identity cleavages tend to produce exclusionary governance strategies and 
are a major obstacle to creating a consensus for prioritising democratic rules of the game.  
 What made Tunisia somewhat different was that these cleavages were more muted, 
partly because of the country’s long history of secularism, down to the agency of the 
founding father, Bourguiba. The more civic political culture was reinforced, as Durac 
observed, because exiled secularist and Islamist elites had a history of dialogue before the 
revolution. The mainstream Islamist party was relatively liberal and the role of Gulf funded 
salafis relatively contained--although not entirely, since several assassinations of secular 
leaders almost precipitated a breakdown similar to Egypt’s.  
 In summary, the more homogeneous the identity and the greater the propensity to 
compromise between Islamists and secularists, the more a civic culture supportive of 
democracy exists (Tunisia). Where identity is fragmented and compromise blocked, the 
Uprising challenge to states resulted in failed states (Syria). A homogeneous culture plus 
failed religio-secular compromise is compatible with a hybrid regime (Egypt). 
 
The International Variable 
The international variable contributed both to precipitating the uprising and to the failure of 
democratic transition. First, not only did the globalization of neo-liberal economics generate 
post-populist crony capitalism, but also the West’s democracy campaigns, empowered by 
globalization of communications, delegitimized post populist regimes. Then, in the wake of 
Uprisings, in good part against neo-liberalism, Western IFIs sought use the weakening of 
economies in uprising states to deepen neo-liberalism in the region, threatening to hollow out 
democratization before it had even began. 
 The external factor was important too, in affecting the power balance between 
regimes and oppositions. The restraint of the army in Egypt was partly a function of foreign 
dependency. While its oil riches ought to have given the Qaddafi regime the resources to 
survive, its relative international isolation opened it to foreign intervention; conversely, the 
survival of the oil-poor Asad regime was contingent on significant external financial and 
military support and protection by its Russian and Iranian allies.  
 At the regional level, the competitive interference of rival powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Turkey) in Uprising states, where they backed warring sides and alternative 
governance models, contributing to democratic reversal or civil war (governance models). 
The Sunni Gulf Cooperation Council powers and Turkey, themselves split over support for 
rival kinds of Islamists, and Iran, deployed sectarian polarization against each other. 
Moreover, both sides used rent transfers to bolster anti-democratic forces--the non-oil 
monarchies, the military in Egypt, the Asad regime, salafis. But with neither side able to 
sweep the board, the result was both the de-stabilization of states and the fragmenting of 
publics between secularists and varieties of rival Islamists. Democratic transition was 
blocked and reconstituted regimes emerging from such communal power struggles were 
likely to incorporate some identity communities in order to exclude others. The resulting 
norm fragmentation meant democracy had little chance of becoming “hegemonic” in the 
region.  
 It can therefore be hypothesized that the more a country becomes an arena of 
competitive interference, the less likely is democratic transition; thus, while Tunisia managed 
to avoid such intervention, Libya suffered its most extreme form, with the result being polar 
opposite outcomes—democratic transition and state failure; Egypt, a middle case, facilitated 
a hybrid state.  
 
The partial reconstitution of governance: emergent regime types 
There is a widespread belief that the popular mobilization unleashed by the Uprising cannot 
be “put back in the box.” The Uprisings unleashed a new wave of instability similar to that 
experienced in the Arab post-independence years, albeit now with much larger, more 
mobilized and, in some places, highly armed, populations. But whether this means 
democratization is unavoidable or whether political participation will, instead, take new 
forms in failed or hybrid regimes remains in contention. As Morten Vallbjorn explained in 
his contribution to this special issue, the notion of re-politicization implies a struggle between 
a re-politicized, more mobilized citizenry less deterred by the fear barrier and rulers trying to 
bring them under control through old oligarchic practices, new authoritarian upgrading 
techniques and, as Stacher points out, unrestrained violence. Elites will have to work harder 
at appeasing, co-opting and dividing the citizenry; but they are likely to be so divided 
themselves that this will not prove easy. The result is likely to be neither stable authoritarian 
or democratic states, but unstable and “failed” hybrids. Politics is likely to be a deepened 
version of Huntington’s 19  “praetorianism”--mixtures of military repression, ballot box 
contestation, street protest and “terrorism”— in which, as he put it “clubs are trumps.” As 
Stacher points out in his article, quantitative studies indicate contested transitional periods 
suffer greater violence—“more murder in the middle.” Nevertheless, a partial reconstruction 
of authority is also underway, even in failed states, with the three major observable 
trajectories driven by different conjunctions of forces. 
 
Outcome 1: State failure and competitive governance 
A major unintended consequence of the Uprising has been state failure. In his article, Adham 
Saouli traced the special vulnerability of the more identity-fragmented Arab states to the 
limited inclusion of identity groups by regimes constructed around sectarian cores and with 
artificial borders exposing them the destabilizing effect of trans-state interference. In such 
states there is a high risk that regime weakening or failure will lead to state failure. In the 
most immediate sense, states’ failure resulted from the incapacity of the military to defend 
their territorial integrity, either because it was kept weak (Libya), was decimated by foreign 
intervention (Iraq, Libya) or suffered significant defections (Syria). There are variations, of 
course, notably between Libya wherein the regime and state disintegrated in parallel vs. Syria 
and Iraq where regimes grouped around a sectarian and territorial core but the state’s overall 
territorial integrity was debilitated.  
 The consequent breakdown of order, particularly in multi-communal societies, ushers 
in the security dilemma, as people fall back on primordial solidarity groups--tribes, sects—for 
survival while demonizing the “other,” with the supposedly “defensive” actions of each 
group making all more insecure. Moreover, as government loses the capacity to deliver 
services and the normal economy fails, rival movements acquire a stake in a war economy 
through smuggling, looting, the arms trade, and exploitation of natural resources (oil), while 
ordinary persons, insecure and deprived of their livelihoods, gravitate to warlords and militias 
for survival or exit the country as refugees.  
 Yet, amidst civil war, “competitive state reconstruction” 20 takes place. Ibn Khaldun 
identified cycles of state collapse and reformation in MENA where historically a new dynasty 
(regime) was founded by a charismatic leader, possessing followers bound both by kinship 
asabiyya (social solidarity) and religious zeal. As Tilly21 and others indicate, opposition 
movements prevail that combine an ideological message, ability to provide security through 
command of armed violence, and control of resources enabling provision of social goods. 
Charismatic leaders with armed followings seeking to construct alternative states are most 
evident in ISIS’s trans-state operations, straddling eastern Syria and western Iraq, aiming to 
create a caliphate and overthrow “artificial” boundaries imposed by “Sykes-Picot,” but 
similar phenomenon are also evident in North Africa as a result of Libyan state collapse and 
in Yemen. In parallel, the surviving cores of pre-existing regime became more dependent on 
ethno-sectarian asabiyya and therefore less institutionalized and inclusive. Whichever side 
prevails, this form of state formation is likely to result in the exclusion of the losers and 
eventual decline into neo-patrimonial rule. However, where neither side can defeat the other a 
“hurting stalemate” could create conditions for a power-sharing settlement, provided the 
‘commitment problem”--that neither side can trust the other to keep their agreements and not 
seek revenge—could be overcome, possibly through international guarantee of a settlement 
and international peace-keepers. The loss of control of formerly centralizing states over their 
territory, combined with the surge of sectarian identities at the expense of state identities, 
suggests that political reconstruction will require new forms of consociational ethno-sectarian 
power-sharing. This is, however, likely to result in a hybrid authority formula, with mixtures 
of authoritarian and pluralist, informal and formal, governance.  
 
Outcome 2: Regime restoration and hybrid Governance  
Where the state remains intact and the regime survives the Uprising, one possible outcome is 
“restoration.” The exceptional mass activism of revolutionary outbursts cannot be sustained: 
Brinton’s classic exploration of post-revolutionary “Thermidor” sees a yearning for order 
empowering a “man on horseback.” Political sociologists such as Mosca and Michels22 
exposed the practices used to restore or sustain elite or class rule in spite of increased 
politicization, revolution and competitive elections: an “Iron Law of Oligarchy is sustained 
through elites’ disproportionate resources (information, wealth), command of the levers of 
bureaucracies and relative cohesion compared to the divided public. In the Marxist tradition 
democracy remains purely formal--“bourgeois,” “for the few”--when the grossly unequal 
distribution of wealth robs formally equal citizenship of substance. The inequality 
accompanying the globalization of finance capital everywhere “hollow outs” democracy. 23  
When powerful bureaucracies, crony capitalists and co-opted worker unions survive an 
uprising, it only takes the on-set of mass weariness of disorder to open the door to 
“restoration.” 
 Yet, in the wake of the Arab Uprising, elites need new forms of “authoritarian 
upgrading” to manage more mobilized masses. While the re-distributive populism through 
which the early republics consolidated themselves is incompatible with economic 
globalization, the subsequent post-populist crony capitalism was an immediate cause of the 
Uprising and cannot be wholly restored either. As such, some hybrid formula combining 
features of both seems likely, with forms of populist jingoism (sectarianism, “war on terror”) 
mixed with electoral authoritarianism. States possessing rents can sustain patrimonial 
practices of co-optation and enable a modicum of welfare populism in order to deter cross-
class mobilization. This is compatible with hybrid regimes, featuring middle levels of both 
elite contestation and mass inclusion.  
   
Outcome 3: Polyarchic Governance:  
The final possible pathway from the Uprising is where democratic transition ends in 
polyarchy. The democratization literature identifies several enabling conditions. The 
existence of a shared political community enabling peaceful electoral contestation24 has been 
problematic in MENA owing to strong sub and supra-state identities rivalling loyalty to the 
state; the Arab Uprising unleashed further powerful cultural wars. However, the state is less 
vulnerable to these rival identities in relatively homogeneous societies where they have 
historical roots (Egypt, Tunisia) as compared to the “artificial” fragmented states of the 
Levant; democratization prospects are better in the former.  
 Second, democratic consolidation rests on a balance of class power and a “democratic 
coalition” able to extract democratization from the state. While rent is widely used by MENA 
regimes to deter such a coalition by clientalizing society and co-opting bourgeosies, where 
rent is modest and where more advanced modernization and industrialization enables a 
democratic coalition between the educated middle class and the organized working class, a 
class balance might be approximated.  
  Weberians such as Huntington25 argued that power must be both concentrated in 
institutions--an executive with centralized command of bureaucracies--and diffused through 
incorporation of mass participation via mass political parties. The prototype is Turkey where 
Ataturk first concentrated power and built institutions; at a later stage, when the requisites of 
democratization were thought sufficient, elites presided over democratization from above by 
transformation of the single ruling party into a two-party system with competitive elections. 
This scenario was vastly facilitated by Ataturk’s successful nation-building project that 
endowed nationalist legitimacy on state institutions. However, in Arab countries, despite 
political liberalization and pluralisation experiments starting in the 1990s, Turkish-style 
democratic institutionalization from above never acquired momentum, in good part because 
nationalist legitimacy was prematurely lost, and instead change was initiated by the Arab 
Spring’s mobilization from below. Democratization requires a transitional insider-outside 
ruling coalition--“clean” remnants of the old regime, notably the bureaucracy, and leaders of 
peaceful protests--with the authority to steer a democratization of the institutions of the old 
regime via multi-party elections.  
 Unfortunately, the conditions of democratic consolidation, a shared identity, a balance 
of class forces, institutions capable of incorporating mass participation, and an inside-outside 
transition coalition were largely absent in the post-Arab Uprising period, with the possible 
exception of Tunisia.  
 
Diverging Pathways: The Determinants of three Prototypical Cases 
Multiple variables shaped the different trajectories followed by Uprising states. These, are 
summarized in Table 1 and are here brought together to explain the three prototypical cases, 
Syria, where transition failed; Egypt where it was reversed and Tunisia where it was 
relatively successful.  
 
Syria: failed transition, failed state  
Conditions for democratic transition were not favourable in Syria: identity fragmentation and 
the lack of a class balance weakened society, while a robust combination of both patrimonial 
authority and bureaucratic institutions gave the regime exceptional resilience. Owing to the 
cross cutting of class inequalities by urban-rural and sectarian cleavages, the narrow 
opportunity structure (weak civil society) and the willingness of the loyal military to use 
violence against protestors, mobilization was insufficient to overthrow the regime but enough 
to deprive it of control over wide parts of the country. The soft-liners were marginalized on 
both sides by the regime’s use of violence, the maximalist demands of the opposition and the 
identity cleavages between regime security forces and the protestors. Defections from the 
military were sufficient, together with high levels of external intervention, to militarize the 
conflict, resulting in protracted civil war and a failed state. This diverted the country away 
from democratization and along other pathways. Anti-democratic agents—the military, 
jihadists--were empowered while democratic forces—the protesting youth, the trade unions--
were marginalized. The Uprising greatly sharpened identity cleavages along both sectarian 
and secular-Islamist lines. No cross-class democratic coalition was conceivable as the 
destruction to the political economy infrastructure debilitated capitalist production relations 
and generated a parasitic war economy that locked Syria into a much-deepened crisis for at 
least the immediate future.  
 
Table 1: Variables Shaping Divergent Tangents 
Variables        Syria      Egypt     Tunisia 
MASS MOBILIZATION  
Cleavages 
 
Opportunity Structure 
     
     
     
     
Mobilization diluted by 
cross-cutting cleavages 
 
Diluted by Low civil society 
experience 
Bandwagoning via cross-
class coalitions 
 
Facilitated by high civil 
society experience 
Bandwagoning via cross-
class coalitions 
 
Facilitated by high civil 
society experience 
    
REGIME CAPACITY  
(co-optative and coercive) 
 
Military role 
 
 
Bureaucratic territorial 
penetration 
Patrimonial-bureaucratic 
balance 
 
 
Low autonomy-loyal to 
leader 
 
 Medium 
Patrimonialism  
bureaucratically constrained  
 
High autonomy 
 
 
High 
Patrimonialism 
bureaucratically constrained  
 
High autonomy 
 
 
High 
    
TRANSITION 
COALITION 
No!presidential survival 
+ protracted insurgency 
!state failure 
Yes!presidential removal, 
transition starts!state 
establishment survival 
Yes!presidential removal, 
transition starts!state 
establishment survival 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
class balance 
economy 
 
 
Lack of class balance 
War economy 
 
 
Lack of class balance 
Rentier economy 
 
 
Some class balance 
Productive economy 
 
 POLITICAL CULTURE 
   Societal identity 
 
   secular-religious      
   cleavage 
  
Fragmented 
 
high   
 
Homogeneous 
 
High 
 
Homogeneous 
 
low 
    
COMPETITIVE 
EXTERNAL 
INTERVENTION 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
low 
 
 
 
    
AGENCY 
Dominant forces and their 
relations 
military vs. radical Islamists military vs. moderate 
Islamists 
moderate Islamists +  
trade unionists +civil society 
OUTCOME Failed State Hybrid regime Polyarchy 
 
Egypt: reversed transition  
In Egypt an anti-regime cross-class coalition and a favourable opportunity structure—
manifest in considerable civil society experience and internet penetration--enabled a massive 
bandwagoning against the ruler; the relative autonomy of the military, which prioritized its 
own interests, enabled an insider-outsider coalition to engineer presidential departure. In spite 
of a relatively peaceful transition from Mubarak’s rule, the post-Uprising power struggle 
between secular revolutionaries, the military and Islamists was unconstrained by agreement 
on rules of the game. The lack of a strong organized pro-democracy movement and 
autonomous trade unions, compared to the over-sized politicized military, and the split 
between secularists and divided Islamists allowed a substantial “restoration” of the old 
regime. This reflected the lack of a balance of class power able to check a rent-funded state. 
Post-Uprising authoritarian upgrading depended on sophisticated versions of divide and rule, 
as exemplified by military’s cooptation of the Muslim Brotherhood to demobilize street 
protests followed by its co-optation of the “Tamarod” (grassroots protest) movement to 
destroy the Brotherhood’s President Morsi. No democracy that excludes one of the most 
important socio-political forces in Egypt can be consolidated and only a hybrid regime, 
retaining extra-constitutional powers for the security forces, can cope with the violent 
spillover of Islamist resistance. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in encouraging and 
supporting the counter-revolution, both in funding the al-Sisi regime and in encouraging its 
Salafist clients to break with the Brotherhood and support the military. A populist-
xenophobic intolerance of dissent more repressive than under Mubarak was combined with 
electoral authoritarianism manifested in Sisi’s election and the rather dim prospects of free 
parliamentary elections amidst the exclusion of the Brotherhood.  
  
Tunisia: transition and institutionalization 
As in Egypt, cross-class grievances and a favourable opportunity structure--civil society 
experience—enabled bandwagoning mobilization that, given the refusal of an autonomous 
military to protect the president, enabled an insider-outsider democratic coalition. Yet 
Tunisia’s transition was not similarly stalled. Political culture inheritances--Tunisia’s secular 
tradition, relative homogeneity and long history of statehood - consolidated the political 
community needed to underpin contestation over other issues. Its historically more moderate 
Islamist movement enabled compromise between Islamists and secularists. What made the 
big difference from Egypt was Tunisia’s larger middle class, greater mass literacy and small 
unpoliticized army. The Islamist en-Nahda party won a plurality in the first post Uprising 
elections, but unlike the Egyptian Brotherhood, shared power with two secular parties, and a 
secularist politician became president alongside an Islamist prime minister. Moderate 
democratic Islamists were much stronger that Salafists and, contrary to the case in Egypt, 
entered a coalition with secularists rather than the Salafists. Nevertheless, before long the 
secularist-Islamist cleavage threatened to destabilize the country: militant salafists’ attempts 
to restrict cultural expression they considered anti-Islamic seemed tolerated by the 
government and the murders of secular political leaders critical of the en-Nahda government 
plunged the country into a crisis in 2013 similar to what was, in parallel, happening in Egypt. 
However, by contrast Egypt, there was no “man on horseback” in Tunisia’s small politically 
unambitious military that rival political forces could call upon to “rescue” the country from 
the other; hence they had to compromise their differences through dialogue. The constituent 
assembly was more inclusive than in Egypt and was able to reach a compromise 
constitutional formula. Crucially, the balance of agency favoured democratic forces. The 
limited role of the military in public life and the exceptional role of the trade union 
movement in brokering a consensus had its origins in the fact that the independence 
movement had combined a powerful political party, the Destour, and an equally powerful 
union movement, pre-empting the role of national vanguard assumed elsewhere, including 
Egypt, by the army.  
 As a result, Tunisia experienced the most thorough democratization. Still, the 
revolution remained purely political: only the top political elite was renewed, with the ouster 
of the ruling family and some ruling party elites while the bourgeoisie and the military 
establishment survived. Indeed, Tunisia experienced a mild restoration as a result of the 
October 2014 elections in which a “Bourguibist” party dominated by old regime elites was 
voted into power at the expense of the post-Ben Ali currents, both the secular democratic 
movements and an-Nahda; the elections reflected both cultural cleavages and nostalgia for 
order and economic stability. Ultimately, the better prognosis for democratic transition in 
Tunisia than elsewhere was rooted in the success of the Uprising in ameliorating (rather than 
aggregating) the pre-Uprising crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
Immediate post-Uprising outcomes varied significantly in line with differing combinations of 
the factors indicated in Table 1. While in Egypt and Tunisia bandwagoning mobilization 
against the regime and military autonomy combined to produce presidential removal and 
regime survival, initiating a relatively peaceful transition from authoritarian rule, in Syria the 
dilution of mobilization by cross cutting cleavages and presidential control of the military 
precluded such a peaceful transition. 
 Differing political economy and political cultural contexts drove further divergence 
among the cases. Homogeneous cultures in Tunisia and Egypt kept the state together 
compared to the state failure resulting from cultural fragmentation in Syria. However, the 
greater cultural of compromise in Tunisia allowed agreement on rules of the game, while 
contests over the rules split Egypt. While Tunisia came closest to a class balance, given the 
relative strength of industrialization and organized labour, external rent in Egypt and a rent-
fuelled war economy in Syria weakened or precluded such a balance. In Tunisia the balance 
of agency—a combination of a weak military, moderate Islamists and strong trade unions--
facilitated democratic transition; in Egypt the domination of the political arena by the strong 
politicized military reversed this transition; while the combination of strong military and 
radical Islamists in Syria led to militarized conflict and the division of state territory. Finally, 
external intervention in Tunisia was too limited to disrupt democratization; medium 
intervention facilitated democratic reversal in Egypt; and intense competitive interference in 
Syria blocked any resolution of civil war.  
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